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WHAT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROMISES AND WHAT IT DOES
Vernon H. Jensen
From the outset of my career in teaching, I have been deeply 
interested in the question of freedom. This interest is in part 
due to my upbringing and in part is the result of my academic training. 
Not only its substance but its origins, extension, and preservation 
have been abiding concerns. We often take freedom for granted, but 
quarrels and fights about its nature, conditions, and scope fill 
our history. Freedom had to be won. It was never, and is not now, 
established universally. It has had to be gained by groups who did 
not enjoy it. Such extensions as have been made were only by power 
of those who sought it. Freedom not only has had to be fought for, 
but, once gained, it has had to be maintained through constant 
defense. Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom.
Freedom, of course, is relative. Freedom of any person or group 
entails accommodation to the freedom of other persons or groups. 
Overall, it emanates from our basic laws and the accommodations of 
the pluralistic interests and institutions of our society. It is 
through institutional accommodation that the freedom of the whole is 
preserved, even while the scope of freedom is extended.
I have studied the origins of freedom in light of an interest 
in economic history and the history of unionism and labor relations, 
and in connection with the accommodation of unions and the practice 
of collective bargaining in our society. The insistence of labor 
unions on recognition and collective bargaining has been viewed by 
opponents, successively, as infringements on owner's property 
rights, management rights, and worker's rights. The first 
opponents of unionism and collective bargaining were concerned with
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interference with the rights and freedom in the use of property-- 
from which arose the accompanying view, substantially in error in 
the United States, that unions were revolutionary and socialistic.
As less narrow viewpoints about legal use of property slowly made 
their way into the courts, the emphasis of opponents of unionism 
shifted to the charge that collective bargaining was an infringement 
upon the "right" of management to manage. Both these early 
contentions faded considerably as employers accommodated to unions 
and to the practice of collective bargaining. (There is another 
thread here, too; management learned there are certain forms of 
freedom through collective bargaining once the practice is 
understood.)
Today, not all the rough edges of controversy have been 
smoothed, or completely smoothed, as may be noted by the recent and 
continuing controversy over "right-to-work" laws, although, in 
part, there has been a shift to the charge that unions interfere 
with the rights of individuals to work and not join unions. Such 
emphasis reveals a basic anti-union animus, for, if the concern for 
the rights of invididuals to work were the genuine and exclusive 
reason for right-to-work legislation, why do its advocates not 
assail the use of seniority, which is one of the most commonly used 
determinants of rights to a job? In those situations where 
seniority prevails--and it is used widely except in situations where 
constant change of job sites negates the value of seniority, or in 
share-the-work situations where seniority is almost a dirty word-- 
it has more influence on preserving jobs for some and denying jobs 
to others than does any form of compulsory membership in unions. 
Also, recently, the civil rights issue has come forward to impinge 
on the rights of unions and the rights of individuals— both the 
right to preserve jobs and the right to gain jobs.
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It is curious that so few instructors in labor relations concern 
themselves with the question of freedom. It is also curious that 
economists have neglected, or else distorted, or perhaps have not 
understood, the nature of collective bargaining. It is not enough 
simply to accept or take freedom for granted, for the quality and 
value of an institution may find support and justification in its 
origins and development.
A study of the institutional development of capitalism, or 
enterprise society if you prefer, is important to an understanding 
of the place and basic character of collective bargaining.
Collective bargaining is a product of a free society, and is found 
in no other. "Freedom of the market," with which the Revolutionary 
War was so intimately concerned, and "freedom of capital" and 
"freedom of labor" are not always thought of as a part of the same 
piece.
"Freedom of capital" to associate is best traced in the rise 
and legalization of the corporate form of business organization.
The British scene gives the clearest chronological account insofar 
as legalization is concerned. It was a long process and "freedom 
of capital" without priviledged charter and with limited liability 
arrived only in the middle of the nineteenth century, when the 
corporation finally achieved legalization, step by step, to the 
point where any group could incorporate legally on an equal basis 
with all others. Concurrently, in the United States, up to 1837, 
legislatures passed individual acts of incorporation for special 
purposes; thereafter, general laws of incorporation came into being 
in state after state.
A study of British history is useful, also, for tracing the 
rise of "freedom of labor." It has two separate meanings, the 
latter of which is of chief interest in this paper. First, "freedom
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of labor" meant the right of workers to market their services 
without encumbrance of the age-old restraints of earlier economic 
regulations imposed by the manorial and guild systems or by laws of 
the land. In a real sense, this freedom was imposed upon the 
British worker as he was forced, or wrenched, from his customary 
employment as the agricultural and industrial revolutions inexorably 
worked themselves out, throwing the workers upon the brutalities 
of the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century labor market. (I am 
not unaware that this seems contradictory or inconsistent with the 
assertion that freedom has to be gained by those who would have it; 
workers in England, as in other places too, had forced upon them 
the freedom to work or the freedom to starve.)
But "freedom of labor" has another, perhaps more important, 
meaning, akin, as should be obvious to anyone who looks closely, to 
"freedom of capital." Both involve associations. In Britain, the 
various Trade Union Acts, particularly those from 1869 to 1875, 
legalized associations of workers, making it lawful for them 
collectively to do whatever was lawful for workers to do as 
individuals, significantly, to bargain over wages and working 
conditions and to strike and picket.
American chronology is different, but the legal principles behind 
the developments are basically the same. The British produced changes 
by statute, whereas, although we inherited the British common law, 
our changes came through our common law.
What is the basic principle to which I refer? In my teaching, 
with labor and management groups as well as in the academic class­
room, I have found it very useful, and very educational, to present 
the proposition that "the intentional infliction of harm is 
actionable," that is, it is a civil wrong (and may be criminal, too) 
and is a basis of a suit for damages. Almost universally the students,
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in whatever group, will agree that it should be. People should 
have redress against others who intentionally do harm to them.
Having achieved assent to this, I question further. I ask union 
folk how in the world they then justify the strike for they 
certainly want to hurt the employer by it; and I ask management 
folk how they can defend the principle that competing entrepreneurs 
want to beat competitors even when they know they are inflicting 
hurt upon them. In my academic classes I challenge the students 
with respect to both. Mostly, there is a good deal of floundering. 
After an appropriate amount of confusion and difference of opinion,
I confess that I have given them only part of the statement of the 
"prima facie" theory of torts, that is, "the intentional infliction 
of harm is actionable unless justified." This, then, provides the 
basis for a further round of discussion as to what constitutes 
justification.
Let a group of representatives of management explain how they 
get away with inflicting harm upon competitors, even to the point 
of diminishing the value of the Tatters' business enterprises 
through reduction of their incomes, and even to driving them out of 
business and destroying their investment. Sure, competitors inflict 
harm and they know or expect they may or will. You know that, too.
But what is the principle which tolerates or justifies that? It 
has been stated already, "the free pursuit of economic self-interest." 
The law permits, or privileges, the infliction of harm which is 
incidental to the pursuit of economic self-interest if the means are 
lawful. Of course, the pursuit must be within the framework of 
legality. There are rules of the game; for example, one cannot 
lawfully pursue self-interest when the motive is malice or the means 
unlawful.
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Some people recoil against what I have been developing here, 
but it is a central factor in enterprise society. This notion in 
our law developed concurrently with the Darwinian principle of 
survival of the fittest and, obviously, it is similar to it. To 
some it is too harsh. Justice Holmes recognized such a viewpoint, 
stating in Vegelahn v. Guntner that if competition were too harsh a 
word, we could substitute for it "free struggle for life"--which 
always has sounded more harsh to me than the term competition.
It took a little doing to get the courts to accommodate the 
strike, as an instrument effectuating the process of collective 
bargaining. Supreme Court opinions of dissent by Justices Holmes 
and Brandeis are particularly interesting here. Fortunately, their 
viewpoint finally prevailed. They tried to uphold the normal actions 
of unions at a time when their colleagues saw unions motivated by 
malice against employers and saw them illegally interfering with 
employers' rights; their colleagues actually applied the law one- 
sidedly, allowing free pursuit of economic self-interest in the field 
of business enterprise while denying to unions the same right; whereas 
Holmes and Brandeis wanted to recognize one principle of law equally 
applicable to both. It should be understood, but is not often 
thought of this way, that collective bargaining is justified by the 
same principle of law that justifies competition.
Time does not permit a discussion of the basic postulates that 
must be understood to appreciate fully the context within which 
collective bargaining takes place in an enterprise society and why 
it is such a valuable and indispensable institution.1 Suffice it to 
say that there is a mutuality of interest between labor and management, 
which is both ideological and pecuniary, but at the same time there 
exists a conflict of interest. It is in an atmosphere of conflict that 
bargaining takes place. In addition, each party is controlled or
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influenced by restraints, external ones (legal, economic, political, 
and social) and internal ones (the rules and requirements of the 
organizations and their internal mix of interests). But of central 
significance is the fact that collective bargaining is a power 
process. It is not a problem-solving process, except incidental to 
the power process, a fact which frequently is not understood or 
appreciated, even by, or especially by, economists. A balance of 
power is necessary and the respective bargaining organizations 
structure themselves (that is, create or modify the bargaining 
structure) to produce such a balance.
Why is the bargaining process so valuable and so important, 
involving, as it does, the proverbial-ridiculous appearing-- 
exhorbitant demands, numerous meetings, marathon sessions before 
a deadline, and settlements almost always only at the eleventh 
hour and often in the corridors rather than at the bargaining table?
The first thing to understand is that negotiations are for the 
purpose of finding out the settlement position of the other party 
without prematurely revealing one's own. This is not understood by 
those who advocate problem solving and who desire each party to lay 
out all the facts on the table at the outset and, then, in all good 
faith, seek the solution the facts would support. This, of course, 
is nonsensical. It would not work. Whereas negotiation, as a process, 
in spite of difficulties does work. Those who practice it 
intelligently are engaged in a very fine and sophisticated art. The 
evidence shows that it produces results not obtainable any other way, 
at least not in a politically democratic enterprise society. Finding 
out settlement positions is only one side of the process. Concurrently, 
it is a process of achieving consent, that is, acceptance of the 
settlement. This is the aspect of collective bargaining that makes 
it so valuable in a democratic sense. It produces results which the
48
parties are willing to live with. (I am fully aware of the importance 
of administration of the agreement, the day-to-day living, which, 
as is often emphasized, is at the heart of the whole business. It, 
too, is of inestimable worth.)
There is a problem which has hovered over the practice of 
collective bargaining from its beginning and it has not been 
satisfactorily faced, let alone resolved. It is both philosophical 
and practical. Under our system of government and the legal 
principles behind it, we are aware that legislative bodies enact 
laws while individual relationships are often governed by contract. 
Legislation and contract are cornerstones of our society. But where 
does the collective bargaining agreement fit in? It partakes of 
each but is different from both; it is not legislation, but often 
resembles it. (Some courts have pictured it as legislation, an 
extension of legislative authority to private groups.) It is not 
contract, although often referred to as such, and does not fit 
very well the requirements of contract. What is needed is a law of 
associations, recognition of the role of groups, or associations, 
in contrast to government and legislation and individuals and 
contract.
This is not to say that associations have not been given some 
recognition in our society, or have not been dealt with under the 
law. The courts, however, have had a predilection toward individuals 
and contract and have shied away from, or avoided, activities of 
groups as groups. There is an individualistic bias in our political 
and legal doctrines. Groups are often seen only as a composite of 
individuals, whereas they are real entities which need recognition 
and, perhaps, some regulation.
The law of contract was a product of freedom, equality of 
individuals, and the right of the individuals to act for themselves 
by recognition of their legal competence. The collective agreement
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meets some of the conditions of contract but not all. Contract 
does not reach to important realities of association. As Louis 
Selznick puts it,
Contract begins from different premises and 
offers tools of analysis that are irrelevant, 
unhelpful, and often downright inimical to 
the development of a jurisprudence of 
associations.2
Associations have an inherent governmental role. They can and do 
serve the interests of their members. But the association, like 
any institution, can be captured by leaders and it can control.
Hence, there is a need to protect the rights of members against the 
centralization of control which may leave the individual helpless or 
simply used by leaders.
It is easy to see that collective bargaining has created new 
institutions; it is a new institution; it is a form of self-government 
under rules which the association develops to achieve its ends. The 
association is an agency of administration. (Here, we see the 
bargaining unit, the bargaining table, and the grievance machinery.) 
How often have we heard of self-government, industrial jurisprudence, 
and the common law of the shop? We recognize these things; we see 
the collective agreement as a useful creation and we feel that it 
should be upheld as binding on the union and on the members. But, 
the fact is, we have not yet fashioned a body of law applicable to 
all aspects of associational life.
This is not to say that associations have not been recognized, 
have not been dealt with under the law, but, as stated, they are 
more than composites of individuals. Judges ought to understand more 
about institutions and institutional behavior. The right of 
association seems to be about as basic and inalienable as any other
—
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right. But this is not enough. Association in our society provides 
many persons with their only meaningful participation in economic 
affairs. The individual, through association, can stand up to 
central authority--whether private or governmental. Besides the 
right to associate, there is the right of freedom in associations; 
private associations can be more bureaucratic and oppressive than 
government. We do as well as we do because of the pluralism of our 
society with the accommodation of countervailing forces produced by 
it. But the law is behind the times and a comprehensive body of 
law, recognizing associations for what they are, would be helpful. 
The collective agreement would then fit into it.
Labor relations and collective bargaining must be the central 
theme in the School, in its curriculum and in all of its educational 
and public activities. The School must never allow itself, nor be 
allowed, by intent or drift, to become simply or primarily, or 
substantially, a social sciences school. The social sciences have 
their place and should be present as adjuncts, not, however, as 
even partners, but only as helpmates. There is a problem and it 
should be recognized and the School should adhere to the role given 
it in its charter.
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